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COMMENTS
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS: A PROPOSAL FOR A
RECOGNIZED TORT ACTION
At the turn of the century, medical science was nascent.
Judicial decisions involving alleged negligent infliction of
emotional distress reflected this; numerous barriers were
constructed for plaintiffs claiming emotional trauma. Be-
cause most emotional or mental injuries were, and still are,
more subtle than physical injuries, and the prevailing socie-
tal norms discouraged lawsuits based on nonphysical inju-
ries, independent claims for emotional distress were denied.
If damages were allowed at all, they were considered "para-
sitic" to another cause of action.'
Nevertheless, as the twentieth century progressed, courts
became more protective of a person's emotional well-being.
This concern was a logical reaction to the growing complexi-
ties of life. At the turn of the century, people did not race
across the sky at breakneck speeds, 2 nor were their fates con-
trolled by so many unknown variables. Because human
existence became increasingly dependent upon machines
and other humans, control over one's own life decreased,
and inversely, the possibility of human upset increased.
Courts recognized that as the responsibility to others in-
creased, so did the legal duty. Many courts now recognize a
cause of action for emotional distress. However, the rate of
progress in various jurisdictions has been remarkably une-
ven.3  This awkward advance from considering emotional
distress as strictly a parasitic injury, to applying the physical
1. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent
Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1238 n.8 (1971).
2. Recently, a Minnesota trial court allowed passenger claims for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress when a TWA flight plunged six miles due, in part, to pilot
error. Jury Gives Jet Passengers Compensationfor Terror, Milwaukee J., Dec. 4, 1983,
§ 1, at 3, col. 1. See also .4 Tort in Transition: Negligent Infliction ofMental Distress,
70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1982).
3. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 15.01, at 361 (1982).
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impact rule, the zone of danger rule, the physical injury rule
and beyond, occurred because courts struggled with the un-
derlying policy considerations in extending liability.4
This comment will summarize the current explosion of
cases and the underlying policy considerations in the by-
stander and direct victim areas of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The term "bystander" throughout this
article refers to those persons who are not immediately
threatened with physical danger in contrast to the direct vic-
tim who is so threatened. After addressing the most con-
servative rule, the physical impact rule, the analysis will
focus on decisions in jurisdictions which have either adopted
the zone of danger rule or have gone beyond it to embrace in
one form or another the factors of "proximity," "contempo-
raneous observance" and "close relationship" to evaluate a
bystander's claim for emotional distress. Although the policy
considerations denying liability to bystanders and direct vic-
tims who have not suffered a physical injury are giving way
to rules based upon the well-settled principles of tort law,
Wisconsin continues to cling to these liability-limiting policy
considerations. Therefore, this comment will suggest
changes in the policy considerations which Wisconsin courts
use to deny recovery in bystander and direct victim
situations.
I. THE IMPACT RULE
For decades the majority view was that a plaintiff could
not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress ab-
sent contemporaneous physical injury or impact.5 This view
required that the plaintiff receive a direct physical injury
from the defendant's negligent act.6 The impact rule was
based upon public policy and judicial practicality.7 Fear of
fictitious claims and an explosion of litigation led courts to
4. Comment, The Common Law Treatment in Wisconsin of the Right to Recover
for Emotional Harm, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1089, 1089.
5. J. DOOLEY, supra note 3, § 15.05, at 371.
6. The leading American cases were Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47
N.E. 88 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Bat-
talla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
7. J. DOOLEY, supra note 3, § 15.05, at 372.
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require a contemporaneous physical injury.8 Courts ac-
knowledged that there could be negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress absent a physical injury; however, recovery of
damages was not allowed because the courts feared it would
be impossible to administer any other rule.9 In reality, many
courts considered psychological injuries to be "too remote
and speculative,"' 0 reflecting a general perception, at least at
the turn of the century, that medical science lacked the tools
to properly diagnose such damages." However, medical
knowledge has advanced in the last half of this century to
such an extent that there is less difficulty in establishing the
causal relationship between the emotional distress and the
injury.'2
Even though several jurisdictions still cling to the impact
rule,' 3 for the most part it has been abandoned as courts be-
gan to whittle it down to an absurdity in the attempt to find
a basis for recovery when just claims were presented.' 4
Clearly, the impact rule is destined for legal extinction.'5
However, where the impact rule has been abandoned, the
8. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897).
9. See id.
10. Comment, supra note 1, at 1237.
11. M. BENDER, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.13(1), at 5-20 (1982). See
Comment, supra note 1, at 1237 n.6.
12. See, for example, Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) and Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970),
where both courts remarked on the advances made in medical science which can be
relied upon in establishing the requisite causal connection between the act and the
psychological injury. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 1248-51.
13. See, e.g., Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark.
1959); Towns v. Anderson, 39 Colo. App. 332, 567 P.2d 814 (1977); Gilliam v. Stew-
art, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). However, heated criticism of the rule was lodged in
National Rental Sys., Inc. v. Bostic, 423 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Pear-
son, J., concurring); Little v. Williamson, - Ind. App. _, 441 N.E.2d 974 (1982);
Howard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, , 662 P.2d 1214, 1219-
20 (1983); Deutsch v. Schein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980).
14. Impact was found where there was only minor contact, such as the inhalation
of smoke, an electric shock, dust in the eye or a circus horse relieving itself onto the
plaintiff. J. DOOLEY, supra note 3, § 15.06, at 374.
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 332 (4th ed. 1971).
As an example, one case which denied recovery based upon the impact rule is ex-
tremely appalling. In Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
a child who witnessed an assailant rob and sexually assault his mother in a hotel room
did not have a cause of action for his mental injuries since there was no alleged physi-
cal "impact" on the child.
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zone of danger' 6 and physical manifestation rules 7 have de-
veloped in its place to guarantee the validity of the plaintiff's
claim.
II. BYSTANDER RECOVERY
A. The Zone of Danger Rule
After many jurisdictions abandoned the impact rule and
allowed plaintiffs to recover for fright caused by fear of in-
jury to themselves, many of these same jurisdictions denied
recovery where emotional distress was caused by plaintiffs
fear for the safety of another.'" Since Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad,9 this physical zone of danger test has been used to
determine whether the plaintiff was sufficiently close to the
defendant's negligent conduct to impose a duty of care upon
the defendant.20 Under this approach, the concept of a fore-
seeable zone of danger extended the duty owed only as far as
the risk of physical harm.21 The leading Wisconsin case of
Waube v. Warrington22 expressly adopted the Palsgraf no-
tion of foreseeability as a device to deny bystander claims.
16. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746-47, 441 P.2d 912, 927, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 86-87 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
17. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980). The Molien court indicated that a majority of jurisdictions still
adhere to a physical injury rule; however, it rejected such a rule. Id. See infra text
accompanying notes 159-64.
18. This zone of danger rule was recognized by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is sub-
ject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a
third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily
harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from
harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise
created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965) (emphasis added).
19. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
20. Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Be-
tween California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 9 (1976).
21. Id.
22. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
[Vol. 67:557
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Since the foreseeability concept was limited solely to the
realm of physical injury rather than psychological injury, in
determining the scope of duty many valid claims of serious
mental injury went uncompensated even though they were
induced by a contemporaneous sensory perception of an in-
jury to a third party.23 Today, even when the plaintiff is
within the zone of danger and thereby threatened with phys-
ical harm, many courts continue to deny recovery when the
emotional distress arises from fear for another's safety.24 Be-
cause of the traditional suspicion of emotional injury, deny-
mng recovery in the situation where the plaintiff is within the
zone of danger suggests that courts are still more concerned
with the foreseeability of the specific nature of the injury
rather than the injury itself.2 - The Restatement (Second) of
Torts takes a different approach. Section 436 allows recov-
ery when a family member is within the physical zone of
danger but his or her emotional distress arises from fear for
another.2 6
The zone of danger rule is best exemplified by Tobin v.
23. Simons, supra note 20, at 9.
24. Id. at 11. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603,258 N.W. 497 (1935).
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 334.
26. Section 436 provides in part:
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright,
shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that
such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emo-
tional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the
other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his
immediate family occurring in his presence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965). See also id. comment (f). The Re-
statement also contains the following caveat to § 436:
The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in Subsec-
tion (2) may apply where bodily harm to the other results from his shock or
fright at harm or peril to a third person who is not a member of his immediate
family, or where the harm or peril does not occur in his presence.
The approach which denies recovery unless the plaintiff fears for his own safety, at
least, rests upon a logical, if not outdated, foundation whereas the Restatement posi-
tion represents the ultimate in arbitrary line-drawing. The Restatement allows recov-
ery where the person is within the zone of danger; but instead of fearing for his own
safety, fears for the safety of another. Yet, if this same person is a few feet away,
outside the zone of danger, even though he still fears for the other (the only change in
conditions is a few feet), he cannot recover.
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Grossman .27 A common factual scenario involving by-
stander recovery claims emerges in Tobin, wherein courts
following the Tobin decision and those choosing instead to
follow Dillon v. Legg28 have split in their determination of
the outcome. In Tobin a child was struck in the street by a
negligent motorist. The mother, who was inside of the house
at the time, did not see the accident but heard the screech of
the brakes, and noting her child's absence, went immediately
outside and saw her child lying in the street. The New York
Court of Appeals noted that unlike the facts of Dillon, where
the mother actually witnessed the car strike her child, it
could not practically limit its consideration to the facts
pleaded before the court.2 9 The California Supreme Court
in Dillon relied on the proximity to and contemporaneous
observance of the accident by the mother, and her close rela-
tionship to her daughter to evaluate the foreseeability of the
injury and to establish a duty. The Tobin court recognized
the role foreseeability played in determining the extent of
duty when it stated that it could foresee harm flowing to the
mother in this situation.3 0 However, it noted that "foresee-
ability, once recognized, is not so easily limited. '' 3'
Essentially, Tobin favored several policy considerations
in determining whether the negligent defendant owed the
plaintiff-mother any duty of reasonable care. It noted that
proof of causation was no longer a major problem since
"mental traumatic causation can now be diagnosed almost
as well as physical traumatic causation." 32 Furthermore, the
court believed that neither the potential increase in litiga-
tion 33 nor an increase in fraudulent claims 34 justified limiting
27. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
28. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
29. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 612, 249 N.E.2d at 420, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court
was referring to the three guidelines developed in Dillon to aid courts in determining
the risk of foreseeable injury which were developed from the facts in Dillon. See infra
text accompanying note 66.
30. See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 442, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
33. See id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. "This court has re-
jected as a ground for denying a cause of action that there will be a proliferation of
claims. It suffices that if a cognizable wrong has been committed that there must be a
remedy, whatever the burden on the courts." Id.
Vol. 67:557
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liability. Tobin, however, confined the duty by considering
the potential for unlimited and unduly burdensome liabil-
ity3 5 The court believed that the potential for unlimited lia-
bility existed if duty was based upon a foreseeability test
alone since it would compel courts to eventually extend cov-
erage to all relatives and bystanders.3 6 The concern over un-
duly burdensome liability was premised upon a dollars-and-
cents argument whereby all motorists would feel the effect in
increased insurance premiums. 7
The Tobin court believed that the policy limitations it
adopted capped the defendant's liability at the only manage-
able point. The Dillon guidelines38 did not sufficiently serve
the purpose of limiting liability since in the Tobin case, the
mother was not a witness to the accident, nor could the court
justify limiting liability to the mother alone, without includ-
m g other family members.3 9 Finally, the Tobin court ob-
served that even Professor Prosser - a scholar who favored
extension of liability - admitted that the Dillon standards
were arbitrary.40
Since the Tobin decision, New York has expressly reaf-
firmed its holding in cases such as Howard v. Lecher.4'
However, the New York court did allow bystander recovery
34. See id. "Similarly, [this court] has rejected the argument that recognizing a
right of recovery may increase the number of fraudulent claims . Id.
35. See id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
38. See infra text accompanying note 66.
39. See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 617-20, 249 N.E.2d at 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560-
62.
40. Admittedly such restrictions are quite arbitrary, have no reason in them-
selves, and would be imposed only in order to draw a line somewhere short of
undue liability; but they may be necessary in order not to "leave the liability of
a negligent defendant open to undue extension by the verdict of sympathetic
juries, who under our system must define and apply any general rule to the fact
of the case before them."
W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 335 (quoting Bohlen, Fity Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L.
REv. 725, 735 (1937)) (emphasis added).
41. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). In Howard the court
denied parents recovery for emotional distress caused by their physician's negligence
in failing to diagnose that the parents were carriers of Tay-Sachs disease which
caused the birth defects in their child.
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for a worker's compensation claim 42 and for emotional dis-
tress, absent any subsequent physical manifestation, where
the plaintiff was a direct victim of the defendant's negligence
and there was proof that the psychic injury was genuine.43
The battle lines have now been drawn in New York between
a plaintiffs attempt to be classified as a direct victim of the
defendant's negligence, which would permit a cause of ac-
tion without proof of physical injury, and defendant's at-
tempt to portray the plaintiff as a bystander.44 Outside of
New York, states that have adopted the Tobin rationale to
deny recovery for bystanders are Arizona, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, North Dakota and Tennessee.45 In Con-
necticut 6 and Washington,47 the courts' stance on the issue
is unclear.
42. See Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975). Wolfe was later explicitly limited in Lafferty v. Manhasset
Medical Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981), to
worker's compensation cases because in a worker's compensation claim the legal rela-
tionship arises not out of any alleged tortious conduct, but solely from the employ-
ment relationship. Id. at 280, 429 N.E.2d at 791, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
43. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1975), where defendant hospital erroneously informed the daughter of a patient that
the patient had died. The court held that the hospital violated a duty owed to the
daughter and was liable for the resulting psychological harm. See also Johnson v.
Jamaica Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 598, 467 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), where the
plaintiffs child was kidnapped from the defendant's hospital. However, for an appar-
ently inconsistent ruling, see Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d
386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
44. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 598, 467
N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 88 A.D.2d 785, 451
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1982); Rainnie v. Community Memorial Hosp., 87 A.D.2d 707, 448
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1982); Lafferty v. Manhassett Medical Center Hosp., 103 Misc. 2d 98,
425 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1980), rev'd, 54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111
(1981).
45. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Rickey v. Chi-
cago Transit Auth., - Ill. 3d _ _, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983); Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So.
2d 1293 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe &
Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978) (although given the right set of facts, the
Tennessee court appears amenable to reconsideration of the rule); Vaillancourt v.
Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).
46. In Connecticut, the lower courts were divided. Compare D'Amicol v. Alva-
rez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) where
recovery was allowed under Dillon, with McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225,
372 A.2d 989 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976) which denied bystander recovery. Then, in the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision of Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80, 438
A.2d 6 (1980), the court, without clearly deciding which route to follow, denied recov-
[Vol. 67:557
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In 1935, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Waube v. War-
rington48 embraced the Pa/sgraf foreseeability theory and
justified its denial of the bystander claim by stating that im-
posing liability on the defendant would be out of proportion
to his culpability; it would place an unreasonable burden on
users of the highway; and it would open the courts to a flood
of fraudulent claims with no rational stopping point.4 9 The
denial of recovery to a bystander was affirmed in Klassa v.
Milwaukee Gas Light Co.5° In Klassa the defendant's em-
ployees negligently caused a minor explosion in the plain-
tiffs basement. The plaintiffs children were in the basement
but the jury located the plaintiff in the backyard, outside of
the zone of danger. The supreme court refused to overrule
the zone of danger rule established in Waube. However, the
court corrected the Waube decision's reliance on Palsgraf to
support the denial of liability.
Since 1931, in Osborne v. Montgomery,5' Wisconsin has
recognized that in order for an act to be negligent, it must
involve a foreseeable risk of harm. 2 Except in the Waube
case, Wisconsin has not limited the concept of duty to spe-
cific plaintiffs. 3 Yet Waube involved a situation similar to
Tobin where the risk of psychological harm to the mother
was clearly foreseeable. 4 Judge Andrews, in his Palsgraf
ery by concluding that a cause of action was not stated under either the zone of dan-
ger or the Dillon rule.
47. In Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975), the court de-
clined to follow the Dillon rule and denied recovery under the traditional zone of
danger rule. However, in Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976),
the court adopted rather broad language in stating that the plaintiff had a cause of
action. It appears that this decision may have implicitly overruled the Grimsby deci-
sion. For further discussion of the case see infra note 110.
48. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). In Waube, the plaintiff, through her front
window, witnessed her young child being struck and killed by a negligent driver. The
plaintiff later died as a result of the emotional trauma.
49. See id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
50. 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).
51. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
52. Comment, The Existence of a Duty in Wisconsin Negligence Cases, 61 MARQ.
L. REv. 447, 457 (1978).
53. Id. at 457 n.33.
54. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301




dissent, would limit liability by factoring foreseeability into
the determination of causation.5 Wisconsin, however, has
eliminated foreseeability from the determination of proxi-
mate cause. Therefore, if duty and breach are found and
there is no break in the chain of causation, the Wisconsin
defendant is liable for all the consequences of his or her
act. 6 Because of this approach, Wisconsin courts rely solely
on public policy to limit the defendant's scope of liability. 7
Recognizing the inconsistency between the Waube adoption
of Palsgraf as the liability-limiting device and the usual Wis-
consin approach, the court in Klassa reaffirmed Waube by
stating that, in fact, the Waube decision was grounded upon
the public policy criteria mentioned above. 8
B. Dillon Foreseeability Test
The most compelling case for the abolition of the "zone
of danger" rule involves parents who suffer severe emotional
distress as a result of witnessing a traumatic injury inflicted
upon their child. The first Restatement of Torts contained a
caveat addressing the issue of whether parents or a spouse
outside the zone of danger may recover for harm suffered as
a result of witnessing an injury to a child or the other
spouse.59 Professor Prosser noted that "it has properly been
said that when a child is endangered, it is not beyond con-
templation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity,
and will suffer serious shock. ' 60 Although the legal the-
oriticians supported recovery, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts contained no such caveat because at the time of adop-
tion there was an absence of case law supporting bystander
recovery for parents.6'
55. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 407, 520 P.2d 758, 765 (1974), which
follows Judge Andrews' approach of limiting liability through the determination of
proximate cause.
56. Comment, supra note 52, at 459.
57. Id. See Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 271
N.W.2d 598, 603 (1978) (listing the six public policy grounds which may be used to
deny liability once negligence is established).
58. Klassa, 273 Wis. at 182-83, 77 N.W.2d at 401.
59. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 313, at 851 (1934).
60. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 353 (3d ed. 1964).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 app., at 11 (1965).
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1. The Dillon Decision
Since the second Restatement, much has happened in the
area of bystander recovery. The leading case allowing the
claim of a bystander is the 1968 California Supreme Court
decision Dillon v. Legg.62 In Dillon it was alleged that the
mother, who was not in the zone of physical danger, and one
of her daughters, who was arguably within the zone of dan-
ger, witnessed an accident in which another daughter was
struck and killed by a negligent driver. Finding a cause of
action, the court emphasized the primary importance of the
foreseeability of risk in establishing a duty owed to the
plaintiff in the absence of overriding policy considerations. 63
The Dillon court recognized the role of public policy in the
formulation of an obligation of duty when it acknowledged
that duty is but "an expression of the sum total of those con-
siderations of policy which lead the law to say that the par-
ticular plaintiff is entitled to protection."'64 However, the
court believed that neither fear of fraudulent claims nor un-
limited liability justified denial of liability.
Like the court in Tobin, the Dillon court remarked that
fear of fraudulent claims should not deny an entire class of
claims.65 Regarding the fear of unlimited liability, the Dil-
lon court stated that this did not justify denial of liability
either; but the court adopted several now famous guidelines
to aid lower courts in determining the degree of
foreseeability:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from
it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contempo-
62. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), overruling Amaya v.
Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). It
is interesting to note that the court inAmaya addressed the three criteria relied upon
in Dillon to establish foreseeability and found them unpersuasive as a means of limit-
ing liability. See Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at _, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
63. Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerg-
ingfrom Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 588 (1982).
64. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (quoting W.
PROSSER, supra note 15, at 332-33).
65. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 736-37, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78. The
court also noted that to deny liability upon fear of fraudulent claims would assume
that juries would be unable to distinguish between fictitious and bona fide claims. Id.
1984]
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raneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the pres-
ence of only a distant relationship. 66
Once the Dillon court overcame objections to liability
based upon the policy considerations, it was able to find a
cause of action. Duty was based upon the foreseeability of
the risk incurred. With the aid of the Dillon guidelines,
lower courts were left to determine whether a duty existed
on a case-by-case basis.67
Since the Dillon decision, the courts in California have
retreated from its liberal interpretation of liability. With
three guidelines to aid its analysis, the Dillon decision em-
phasized foreseeability in determining the scope of duty.68
However, possibly rising to the challenge issued in Tobin of
not being able to control the extent of liability under the Dil-
lon guidelines, decisions since Dillon have construed the
guidelines as strict requirements needed to establish a cause
of action.
Initially, the California courts did not limit themselves to
a rigorous interpretation of the Dillon guidelines. 69  How-
ever, in order to limit recovery, these courts eventually fell
prey to a game of semantics and inference in interpreting
Dillon, especially the "sensory and contemporaneous" fac-
tor.70 In borderline recovery cases, California courts now
66. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
67. See id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. In a parting blow to the
zone of danger rule, the Dillon court observed that the facts before it demonstrated
the artificiality of that rule since the surviving daughter, who was arguably within the
zone of danger, would have a cause of action, while the mother, who was located only
several yards away, would not. The court also found the rule illogical since Califor-
nia had previously rejected the "impact" rule and the zone of danger was a mere
extension of that rule since it required fear of impact. Id. at 753, 441 P.2d at 915, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 75.
68. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 589.
69. Id. at 589-90.
70. The most litigated Dillon guideline is the "sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance of the accident." Two decisions which indicate the flexibility originally in-
tended by this particular Dillon guideline are Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562
P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), and Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d
253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). In Krouse, the plaintiff was seated in the driver's seat of
a parked car. His wife was removing groceries from the back seat when the defendant
driver smashed into the car, killing plaintiff's wife. In response to the plaintiff's claim
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have to jump through formalistic reasoning hoops in order
to allow recovery. 7' Not only have California courts strictly
construed the "sensory and contemporaneous" guideline,
they now also require that the occurrence causing the emo-
tional distress be a sudden event. 2 In light of the California
for emotional injury under Dillon, the court noted that "direct emotional impact...
from sensory and contemporaneous observance" did not require visual perception of
the impact causing the injury. Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 76-78, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal.
Rptr. at 872-73. The court concluded that the plaintiff must have perceived that his
wife was struck because "he knew her position an instant before the impact, observed
defendant's vehicle approach. . . and realized that defendant's car must have struck
her." Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. In Archibald the court ex-
tended recovery to a mother who did not actually witness the accident but saw the
child moments after the accident. Archibald's holding was later explained by an ap-
pellate court which inferred that Mrs. Archibald must have heard the explosion from
the accident and therefore she experienced a contemporaneous sensory perception.
Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 221, 224-25, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 885 (1973). Because of this limitation placed upon the Archibald holding,
later cases have been able to deny recovery where a mother arrived on the scene of
the accident minutes after its occurrence. See, e.g., Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App.
3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977). Recovery was also denied where parent-plaintiffs
were following the defendant's car in which their daughters were riding up a winding
road when the parents pulled around a bend in the road only to see the defendant's
car wrapped around a telephone pole. See Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
71. A cause of action was allowed where a mother heard someone yell, "[ilt's
Danny," whereupon she ran to the neighbor's yard only to see her son being pulled
from the pool. Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559, 145 Cal. Rptr.
657, 659 (1978). In order to find a contemporaneous observation, the court, however,
had to state that the plaintiff envisioned the scene of the accident when she heard the
scream. Id. at 566, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664. This hoopjumping was required because of
the Justus decision, which will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-80. The
Nazaroff decision is inconsistent with Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977), which denied recovery where the parents arrived upon the
scene minutes after the accident. If, instead of being alerted by the scream of the
person finding the body, the mother in Nazaroff discovered the body herself at that
same moment of the scream, the impact could not be considered contemporaneous
under Arauz. Again, assuming this hypothetical, Nazaroff is also inconsistent with
the later decisions of Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr.
495 (1978), and Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980),
where the court denied a mother's cause of action where she left her child, who was
being treated in the hospital due to her physician's negligence, to pay the bill, only to
return minutes later and find the child dead. Further, in a case similar to Nazaroff,
recovery was denied where a playmate of the victim ran into the house to tell the
parent-plaintiffs that their son had been electrocuted. Hathaway v. Superior Court,
112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
72. See Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1973), where a mother watched her child slowly die in the hospital due to
an alleged negligent diagnosis by her physician. See also Ochoa v. Superior Court,
143 Cal. App. 3d 611, 191 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1983) for a similar holding. The outcome of
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experience with the Dillon guidelines, a summation and in-
terpretation of the guidelines is appropriate. Besides being
located at or near73 the scene of the accident or sudden oc-
currence, the plaintiff must experience a sensory perception
of the event, although not necessarily visual, that has an
emotional impact greater than that which would otherwise
be experienced by any parent or close relation who has not
observed the accident or sudden occurrence, but who instead
learned of the event later.
The California Supreme Court in Justus v. Acthison74
strictly interpreted the Dillon guidelines and led to the stam-
pede of cases denying recovery. In Justus a father was in the
delivery room during the alleged negligent delivery of his
child. The father's complaint stated that he witnessed the
manipulation of the fetus by the doctors, the emergency pro-
cedures performed on his wife in connection with the at-
tempted caesarian section, and the pain and trauma suffered
by his wife. Finally, he alleged that he was present when the
attending physician announced the death of the fetus. The
court denied the father's cause of action for emotional dis-
tress. The court noted that it had no doubt that the scene
induced a "growing sense of anxiety on the plaintiff's
part. ' 75 However, that anxiety did not ripen into a "disa-
bling shock which resulted from the death of the fetus until
he was actually informed of that event by the doctor; prior to
that moment, as a passive spectator he had no way of know-
ing that the fetus had died."76 In other words, "he had been
the Jansen case is difficult to rationalize with Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976). The Mobaldi court allowed
recovery when a child screamed and convulsed in the arms of her mother and eventu-
ally was rendered brain-damaged after being given the wrong intravenous solution.
In both Mobaldi and Jansen the mothers were unaware of the negligence at the time.
In both cases, the mothers observed the unexpected deterioration of their children.
The only difference is that in Mobaldi it took place over a much shorter period of
time. In noting this discrepancy, the court in Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937,
946-47, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (1977), explained that the Jansen time restriction was
related to the purpose for the Dillon guidelines, which was to avoid unlimited
liability.
73. See Powers v. Sissev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974); Deboe
v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
74. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).




admitted to the theater, but the drama was being played on a
different stage." 7 The plaintiff failed to establish a direct
emotional impact caused by a sensory and contemporaneous
observation of the injury to the fetus in the mother's uterus.
Yet the Dillon standard asks whether the emotional distress
resulted from the "contemporaneous observance of the
accident. 78
The California courts have taken the guidelines proposed
by Dillon to aid in the determination of the degree of fore-
seeability and have transformed them into an inflexible
duty-limiting device. One commentator has even suggested
that Justus reformulated Dillon and that, regardless of fore-
seeability, the plaintiff has no cause of action unless certain
requirements are met.79 The Justus court also may have ad-
ded another requirement to the Dillon criteria. The Justus
court noted that the Dillon cause of action presupposes an
involuntary spectator. However, the plaintiff in Justus was
voluntarily present in the delivery room and the court re-
marked that he should have been prepared for the possibility
of unpleasantness and complications.80 This emotional un-
preparedness standard has been advocated as a replacement
for the Dillon formulation.81
While they have succeeded in limiting liability under the
Dillon guidelines, the California courts may have over-
reacted to early criticism of the Dillon formulation and now
have adopted an inflexible approach to bystander recovery.
However, the Dillon guidelines still represent the best ap-
proach since they balance the plaintiff's right to recovery
against public policy concerns. Since the Dillon decision,
77. Id. at 584, 565 P.2d at 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
78. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968). See also
Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 595.
79. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 595. Besides a strict construction of the
Dillon factors, this commentator noted the additional requirement that the plaintiff
immediately understand the seriousness of the injury suffered by the third party. Id.
80. 19 Cal. 3d at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111. Accord Cortez v.
Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 649-50, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 910 (1980). See also Nolan
& Ursin, supra note 63, at 597. In Cortez, the court followed Justus and denied the
existence of a cause of action where the mother, whose child was in the hospital due
to the negligence of her physician, left the child's room to pay the bill. When she
returned the child was dead.
81. See Comment, Limiting Liabilityfor the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress: The "'Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1981).
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many jurisdictions have recognized the inherent fairness of
its approach.
2. Jurisdictions Following Dillon
Since the Dillon decision, a large percentage of the juris-
dictions that have considered the bystander issue have
adopted or modified the Dillon approach. In D'Ambra v.
United States8 2 a mother witnessed a United States postal
truck strike and kill her child. Initially, suit was brought in
the federal district court where, after adopting the Dillon cri-
teria, the court added a fourth element requiring that the
plaintiff's presence also be foreseeable along with the fore-
seeability of her mental injury.83 In 1975, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed this decision and addressed the pol-
icy issues which have been used to deny the existence of a
duty.84 The court concluded that the crucial issue of unlim-
ited liability was adequately addressed by the Dillon crite-
ria.85 The court added that additional factors, depending on
the circumstances of the case, may also limit liability.86
In 1979, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Sinn v.
Burd87 also abandoned the zone of danger rule in favor of
the Dillon foreseeability test. The court reasoned that the
emotional impact on a parent who witnesses the death of a
child was "as great and as legitimate" as the apprehension of
82. 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975).
83. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819 (D.R.I. 1973). Because
the question was one of first impression in Rhode Island, the district court held that a
cause of action existed under the Dillon criteria. The court offered the following
guidelines to help in the determination of the additional presence requirement:
(1) The age of the child; (2) the type of neighborhood in which the accident
occurred; (3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighborhood; (4) the
time of day; and (5) all other circumstances which would have put the
tortfeasor on notice of the likely presence of a parent.
Id. at 820.
84. The court grouped the policy issues into three categories: moral, economic
and administrative. The court stated that imposition of liability under the facts of this
case would not be so fantastic or freakish as to constitute a moral outrage. As to
economic and administrative concerns, these items, in themselves, should not bar re-
covery. D'mbra, 114 R.I. at - 338 A.2d at 528-30.
85. See id. at _, 338 A.2d at 531.
86. Id.
87. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (plurality opinion). Again, the factual sce-
nario was that of a mother witnessing her child being struck by a negligent motorist.
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fear of impact under the zone of danger rule."" The court
went on to discuss and refute several policy arguments
against bystander recovery.8 9 Concerning the central issue
of unlimited and unduly burdensome liability, the Sinn
court noted that duty is an elastic notion based upon the sum
of policy considerations which, in turn, depend on the values
of the community, and that imposing liability is not unrea-
sonable if society favors such a position.90 Sinn also refuted
the Tobin position that expansion of liability would be tanta-
mount to creating a new duty. Rather, it would broaden the
scope of recognized damages flowing from the negligent con-
duct.91 To alleviate fears that plaintiffs could recover for in-
consequential shock or that defendants would be responsible
for distress suffered by the most sensitive members of the
community, Sinn required that proof of serious mental dis-
tress be proven by the reasonable person standard.92  Fur-
thermore, in order to circumscribe the area of liability, the
court would apply the three factors of Dillon to determine
whether the injury was foreseeable.93
88. Id. at _, 404 A.2d at 677.
89. The court rejected the argument that medical science is unable to establish a
causal link between psychological damage and the negligent act. Id. at _, 404 A.2d
at 678. The court also dismissed the argument that to allow recovery would open the
door to fraudulent claims and result in a flood of litigation. Id. at - 404 A.2d at 679-
80.
90. See id. at _ 404 A.2d at 681-82 (citing Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH.
L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1953)). Under this modem notion of duty, if society deems it appro-
priate that someone be responsible for the harm, then a duty is created to refrain from
inflicting that harm.
91. See Sinn, 486 Pa. at _ 404 A.2d at 683.
92. See id. at - 404 A.2d at 683. See also Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398,
408, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (1974).
93. See Sinn, 486 Pa. at _ 404 A.2d at 685. Subsequent to the Sinn decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not allow a cause of action for emotional distress
where the plaintiff was not present at the scene of the accident. See Yandrich v.
Radic, 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981). The Yandrich court denied recovery where a
father saw his son for the first time in the hospital after the accident. The plaintiff
argued that the Dillon line of liability was arbitrary and that the harm was no less
foreseeable than if the plaintiff had been present at the accident. The court con-
curred, but declined to extend liability into the "realm of uncertainty." Id. at _, 433
A.2d at 461. Three dissenting justices would have allowed the cause of action. See id.
at _ 433 A.2d at 461 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
94. 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980). The facts of Portee were quite gruesome.
The plaintiffs young son had become trapped between the elevator door and the wall
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Similarly, in the 1980 decision of Portee v. Jaffee,94 the
New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned the zone of danger
rule in favor of a modified, stricter form of the Dillon crite-
ria. The court required that an intimate family relationship
exist and that plaintiffs claim be allowed only where the vic-
tim died or suffered serious injury.9 Next, the plaintiff must
observe the death or injury at the site of the accident.96 Fi-
nally, the court would require that the plaintiff suffer severe
emotional distress.97 All criteria were designed to limit lia-
bility and guarantee the authenticity of a plaintiffs emo-
tional distress claim.
While D'Ambra, Sinn and Portee are the most frequently
cited decisions after Dillon in the area of bystander recovery,
Michigan and Texas were the first jurisdictions to follow Dil-
lon ." Other jurisdictions have also recently adopted the Dil-
lon approach. In Corso v. Merrill,99 for example, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the Dillon foreseeability
requirements and allowed the mother to recover after she
heard a thud, looked outside and saw her daughter lying in
the street. In Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc. 100 the
of the elevator shaft. The child screamed and flailed his arms for several hours as
firefighters frantically worked to set the child free. The child, however, eventually
died. His mother witnessed the entire scene.
95. See id. at _ 417 A.2d at 526-27. The Portee court noted that, in its opinion,
the intimate family relationship was the most important of the Dillon factors since it
usually assured that a deep emotional injury was inflicted.
96. Id. at , 417 A.2d at 527. The court noted that discovery of a serious injury
to an immediate family member would always threaten a person's emotional well-
being; however, it was believed that only a witness at the scene of the accident would
suffer a traumatic sense of loss that would inflict that higher degree of serious emo-
tional distress. Id. at _ 417 A.2d at 527. Since Portee, one case, Mercado v. Trans-
port of N. J., 176 N.J. Super. 234, 422 A.2d 800 (1980), has allowed recovery where a
parent came upon the scene shortly after the accident. Another case, Bischoffv. Koh-
lrenken, 185 N.J. Super. 548, 449 A.2d 1347 (1982), however, disallowed recovery
where the parent saw his child for the first time after the accident in the hospital.
97. Portee, 84 N.J. at _ 417 A.2d at 527.
98. See Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973). In
Toms, the court did not expressly adopt the Dillon guidelines, however they were
later adopted in Gustafson v. Faris, 67 Mich. App. 363, 369, 241 N.W.2d 208, 211
(1976). See also Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974).
99. 119 N.H. 647,406 A.2d 300 (1979), affdsub nom. Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., - N.H. _, 448 A.2d 407 (1982). However, Jarvis noted that damages for
emotional distress will not be awarded when it arises from a breach of contract.
100. 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). The court noted that the "zone of danger test...
represents a narrow and rigid limit on liability which seems to us far more arbitrary
and unjust than the . . . foreseeability rule adopted by. . . Dillon." Id. at 436.
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Maine Supreme Court adopted the Dillon foreseeability ap-
proach and noted that unlike their application by its Califor-
nia counterpart, the three factors should not be applied
rigidly. 10 1 In 1981, when the Iowa Supreme Court adopted
Dillon in Barnhill v. Davis, 102 it determined that the Dillon
guideline of "closely related" required that the plaintiff and
the victim be related within the second degree of consan-
guinity.10 3 In addition, the court placed further limits on the
Dillon cause of action by adopting similar standards to those
adopted in Portee. The court required that a reasonable per-
son in the plaintiff's position would believe, and the plaintiff
actually did believe, that the victim would be seriously in-
jured and as a result of that belief, the plaintiff suffered se-
vere emotional distress. 1°4 In Illinois, a recent court of
appeals decision repudiated the impact rule and adopted the
Dillon approach, however, this decision was reversed by the
Illinois Supreme Court in favor of the zone of danger rule. 10 5
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico and Ohio are the
most recent state courts to adopt the Dillon approach to duty
in bystander cases; 10 6 the Missouri, 07 as well as Nevada, 08
101. See id. at 437.
102. 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981). Plaintiff was followed by his mother in her
car. When plaintiff pulled through an intersection and pulled over to wait for his
mother, he saw her get hit in the intersection. The mother received a slight bruise, but
because of the incident, the plaintiff alleged serious emotional distress manifested by
subsequent physical injuries.
103. See id. at 108.
104. See id.
105. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 I1. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596
(1981), rev'd, - Ill. 3d _, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
106. See, e.g., Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 439, 444 (Miss. 1982); Versland
v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583, 586-87 (Mont. 1983) (also requiring death or seri-
ous injury to the victim); Ramirez v. Armstrong, - N.M. _ 673 P.2d 822 (1983)
(adopting a modified, stricter Dillon approach requiring intimate family relationship,
a direct emotional impact from contemporaneous sensory perception and, similar to
Portee, an injury to or death of the victim; a physical manifestation is also required).
See also Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, _, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766-67 (1983), where
the court noted that with the second Dillon factor, a contemporaneous observance, it
would not be necessary to see the accident since hearing it would suffice. This view is
consistent with the present California approach. See supra notes 70-71 and accompa-
nying text. As for the third Dillon factor, whether the plaintiff and victim are closely
related, the court stated that a strict blood relationship is not required. Id. at _ 451
N.E.2d at 766-67. See also Versland, 671 P.2d at 587.
107. In Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1983), the court abrogated the
impact rule in favor of allowing recovery, even absent physical manifestation of the
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courts appear to be on the verge of adopting the Dillon
guidelines.
3. Beyond Dillon
Several jurisdictions have gone beyond the Dillon fore-
seeability guidelines in bystanders cases. In Leong v.
Takasaki'0 9 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiff, who was walking across the road with his foster grand-
mother, could recover for emotional distress after he
witnessed a negligent motorist strike and kill his grand-
mother. The Hawaii court had previously held that there
was a duty to refrain from negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 10 The Leong decision further refined this cause of
action. It rejected the Dillon guidelines for establishing fore-
seeability of the injury because it considered those guidelines
arbitrary."' Instead, the court held that trial courts must
find as a matter of law that conduct which creates a reason-
ably foreseeable risk of psychological injury is the proximate
cause of any damages arising from the consequences of the
defendant's negligent act.'1 2  The Leong court also stated
emotional injury. This was a direct victim negligence case where the plaintiff became
entrapped in an elevator. The court emphasized that liability is to be based upon
foreseeability of the injury. Certainly, the Missouri court will soon be asked to rule
on the bystander issue and given the language of the Bass decision, the court should,
at least, adopt the Dillon approach.
108. In Nelson v. Nelson, 99 Nev. _ 665 P.2d 1141 (1983), the court noted that
the plaintiff did not state a cause of action under the Dillon guidelines. Id. at - n.4,
665 P.2d at 1144 n.4.
109. 55 Hawaii 398,,520 P.2d 758 (1974).
110. See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The Rodrigues
court held that negligent infliction of emotional distress, caused by property damage
to the plaintiffs home, was actionable. The boundaries of defendant's duty were to
be confined to the foreseeable mental distress created by defendant's unreasonable
conduct. Mental distress could be found where a reasonable person could not ade-
quately cope under the circumstances. Id. at _ 472 P.2d at 520. Washington is
another jurisdiction which has adopted the broad language of Rodrigues. See Hun-
sley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976), where plaintiff was allowed a
cause of action against a neighbor who crashed into the back of plaintiffs house.
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress because of fear for her husband, who was in an
adjoining room.
11. See Leong, 55 Hawaii at 410, 520 P.2d at 765.
112. Id. at 407, 520 P.2d at 764-65. Leong also reiterated that Hawaii does not
require a physical manifestation of the emotional injury. Id. The court did note that
there are two recognized classes of psychological injury. The first is the "primary
response" which is manifested by fear, grief, anger and shock. Usually this injury is
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that a blood relationship between the plaintiff and the victim
is not required."13
Because of the fear that Leong did not realistically limit
liability, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Kelley v. Kokua Sales
& Suppl, Ltd., 14 imposed an arbitrary distance restriction.
In Kelley the plaintiff, who lived in California, was informed
over the telephone of the death of his daughter and
grandchildren as a result of a car accident in Hawaii. He
then suffered a heart attack. The court concluded that the
Leong decision, as applied to the facts in Kelley, did not ad-
equately limit liability and, therefore, the plaintiff, as a mat-
ter of law, was not owed a duty of care by the defendant." 5
In the 1981 decision Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Sta-
tion,116 the Hawaii court retreated from the position adopted
in Kelley. In Campbell the court allowed recovery where the
family heard over the telephone that their family dog had
died due to the negligent care of the defendant. Distinguish-
ing Campbell from Kelley, the court stated that Kelley stood
for the proposition that a bystander can only recover if he or
she is located within a reasonable distance from the acci-
dent." 7 In Campbell the family lived in Honolulu which
was considered within a reasonable distance from the
tortious event, while in Kelley, the plaintiff lived in Califor-
nia. Even though the plaintiffs in both cases learned of the
tortious event over the telephone, the Hawaii court appears
to have drawn an extremely arbitrary line, deciding that only
those who are located in Hawaii at the time of the accident
have a cause of action.
of short duration. The second is the "secondary responses which may be termed trau-
matic neurosis." This response is longer lasting and is evidenced by an individual's
inability to cope with the traumatic event. Although the secondary response is much
easier to prove by medical testimony and it is therefore easier to recover, difficulty of
proof should not necessarily bar recovery for primary responses. Id. at 411-13, 520
P.2d at 766-67. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 1248-63.
113. Leong, 55 Hawaii at 410, 520 P.2d at 766.
114. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). The dissent, however, contended that
Hawaii has adopted Justice Andrews' minority position in Palsgraf and therefore the
defendant was liable for the harm proximately caused. The only limitation is that
plaintiff must prove serious mental distress. Id. at 211, 532 P.2d at 678 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676.
116. 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981).
117. Id. at _, 632 P.2d at 1069.
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In Dziokonski v. Babineau 18 Massachusetts extended the
Dillon requirements in order to hold that a bystander has a
cause of action. The court recognized that the majority of
jurisdictions follow the zone of danger rule, but, as other
courts addressing this issue have done, Dziokonski rejected
the underlying policy arguments supporting the denial of lia-
bility.119 Stating that the zone of danger rule was an inade-
quate measure of foreseeability and that the rule lacked
strong logical support, the court adopted a modified version
of Dillon.120 The court stated that reasonable foreseeability
is the touchstone of liability and held that when the victim is
injured it is reasonably foreseeable that those persons with
emotional attachments to the victim will be affected.12 1 Ac-
knowledging the size of this class of persons, the court never-
theless believed that the artificial zone of danger rule was
unjust.1 22 It emphasized that the focus must be on the un-
derlying principles of damage and causation. Therefore, in
order to recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate a subsequent
substantial physical injury and prove that the defendant's
negligence caused the injury.12 3 Observing that the Dillon
factors may aid in the analysis, the court noted that "it does
not matter in practice whether these factors are regarded as
policy considerations imposing limits on the scope of reason-
able foreseeability. . . or as factors bearing on the determi-
nation of reasonable foreseeability itself."'' 24
Loosely applying the Dillon factors, the Massachusetts
court concluded that a cause of action existed for a parent
who sustained substantial physical injuries based upon emo-
tional distress as a result of either witnessing harm to his or
118. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). In Dziokonski, a child was struck by
a negligent driver. The mother rushed to the scene minutes after the accident's occur-
rence and saw her daughter lying on the pavement. While accompanying her daugh-
ter to the hospital in the ambulance, the mother suffered a fatal heart attack. The
father, after learning of these events, also suffered a fatal heart attack. The court
allowed the cause of action brought by both their estates for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
119. See id. at., 380 NE.2d at 1299.
120. See id. at _ 380 N.E.2d at 1300.






her minor child or arriving on the accident scene shortly
thereafter. 5 Under Dziokonski, the most important factor
is the relationship between the plaintiff dnd the victim,
whereas a "contemporaneous observance" is not as impor-
tant in determining whether a claim exists.
C Recommendation for Change
In our increasingly complex society, the orderly and nor-
mal function of a man's mind is as critical to his well-being
as physical health. Indeed a sound mind within a disabled
body can accomplish much, while a disabled mind in the
soundest of bodies is rarely capable of making any sub-
stantial contribution to society.
126
A normal functioning mind is critical in today's competi-
tive and complex society. Yet, many jurisdictions, including
Wisconsin, will not recognize a cause of action for emotional
distress when the plaintiff is a bystander. 27 Justification for
this stance is often based upon valid policy reasons. How-
ever, in at least one situation, the zone of danger rule fails to
fulfill the policy objectives. This failure occurs when a se-
vere emotional injury to a spouse or parent is inflicted as a
result of the individual's witnessing the negligent killing or
maiming of his or her spouse or child. 28 Such injuries are
clearly foreseeable within the psychological zone of danger.
125. See id. Because Dziokonski allowed the cause of action where the plaintiffs,
especially the father, were not present at the time of the accident, the court in al-
lowing their claims appeared to concentrate on the relationship between the plaintiffs
and the victim, rather than their lack of "observance" of the accident. Therefore, the
decision in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980), was inevitable. In Ferriter, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a
man's wife and children had a cause of action when they saw him in the hospital for
the first time after the tortious event. The court stated, "[a] plaintiff who rushes onto
the accident scene and finds a loved one injured has no greater entitlement to com-
pensation for that shock than a plaintiff who rushes instead to the hospital. So long as
the shock follows closely on the heels of the accident, the two types of injury are
equally foreseeable." Id. at _ 413 N.E.2d at 697. Because of these broad holdings,
Massachusetts, like Hawaii, recently imposed a distance requirement. See Cohen v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581, 587 (1983), where a
mother's cause of action was not allowed when she heard of her son's death over the
phone. In Massachusetts, although the plaintiff must observe the victim, it does not
have to be "contemporaneous" to the tortious event.
126. Comment, supra note 1, at 1237.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 18-58.
128. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1096.
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However, the reasons used to justify the impact rule are still
used to justify the existence of the zone of danger rule.1 29
Although these reasons have been debunked many times,1 30
it appears necessary to do so again because Wisconsin, fol-
lowing its decision in Waube, continues to cling to them to
support the zone of danger rule.
Denying a cause of action because of fears of a flood of
litigation and fraudulent claims indicates a basic distrust of
the psychological injury. Yet, even courts which deny liabil-
ity by applying the zone of danger rule admit that this fear
alone is insufficient to deny liability and that medical science
has progressed to a point where legitimate diagnosis is possi-
ble.13' Courts have fashioned guidelines, such as those used
in Dillon, to prevent fraudulent claims. Indeed, what could
be more natural than for a mother to suffer severe emotional
distress after witnessing a debilitating injury to her child?
Under the Dillon system there may be fraudulent claims, but
rejecting an entire class of claims based upon isolated in-
stances is admitting that the inconvenience of administering
such a rule is a legitimate basis for denial of recovery. This
notion, as previously pointed out, has been rejected many
times. Furthermore, the zone of danger rule, at least in Wis-
consin, produces a harsh inequity. 32  As to the fear of a
129. See supra text accompanying note 7.
130. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 327.
131. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-16, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-59 (1969). See also Comment, supra note I, at 1245, 1250,
1251-53. One commentator noted that the distrust of the mental injury "was certainly
a product of its time. It was a time when medical science, especially that branch
concerned with the study of emotions, was in its infancy." Leibson, Recovery of Dam-
ages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163,
163 (1977). Medical science has now grown to the point where diagnosis of mental
injury can be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty; unfortunately
courts have felt restricted by the earlier precedent in recognizing this evolution. Note,
Mental Distress, 63 GEO. L.J. 1179, 1184-85 (1975).
132. Wisconsin under Waube v. Warrington, 203 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935),
will not allow a cause of action where a mother a few feet away sees her child run
over by a car, but under the holding of Hawes v. Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Wis.
2d 524. 309 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1981), will apparently allow a cause of action
where the mother is in the direct line of the car but jumps out of its path and is hit in
the foot by a flying stone.
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flood of litigation, other states which have allowed bystander
recovery have not experienced such an occurrence. 33
The only policy reasons which may legitimately support
a denial of a duty are unlimited and unduly burdensome lia-
bility. Essentially, the issue revolves around whether courts
are willing or able to fashion relief for the parent or spouse
bystander.
Regarding unduly burdensome liability, Tobin described
this policy consideration as a "kind of dollars-and-cents" ar-
gument. 34 The court asserted that expanding the duty owed
to bystanders would impose increased insurance costs on so-
ciety. However, Judge Keating, in his Tobin dissent, ob-
served that the majority did not offer any evidence to
support its assertion. 35 Similarly, the courts in both Sinn v.
Burd136 and D'Ambra v. United States 37 found the "dollars-
and-cents" argument unpersuasive. Indeed, if the court can
fashion relief for situations involving parents, spouses or
loved ones, the number of such claims in relation to the cost
spreading ability of insurance should have a minimal effect
on society's pocketbook. Even if the cost of insurance esca-
lates, this should still not deter the bringing of a just claim.
Prevailing values demand accountability. In D'Ambra the
Rhode Island Supreme Court phrased the issue in a moral
tone: assuming the risk is foreseeable and potential liability
should not outrun culpability, would society be outraged at
133. For example, it appears that the California appellate division has heard less
than 70 appeals in this area over the last 15 years. This number certainly does not
represent a flood of litigation, given the size of that state's court system. Further-
more, many bystander recovery cases will involve a death or serious injury where the
plaintiff would be bringing a wrongful death action, or if the victim survived, a joint
action for loss of consortium. Therefore, any additional burden on the judicial system
would probably be minimal. A recent case adopting the Dillon standards noted that
in those states following the California lead, a flood of litigation has not materialized.
See Ramirez v. Armstrong, - N.M. _ 673 P.2d 822 (1983). See also A Tort in
Transition: Negligent Inl.iction of Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (1984).
134. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 559 (1969).
135. See id. at 620, 249 N.E.2d at 425, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 563 (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Keating also noted that ever since the courts began recognizing claims in
product liability actions, there has been an increasing recognition that the argument
concerning unlimited liability has no merit.
136. 486 Pa. 146, _ 404 A.2d 672, 684 (1979).
137. 114 R.I. 643, - 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975).
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the imposition of liability where a mother saw her child run
down in the road?138
The Tobin court suggested that the problem of unlimited
liability is exemplified by extending recovery for harm to un-
foreseeable consequences.139 Courts have admitted that this
could be a problem, but have, as in the case of Dillon, placed
limitations on the extent of the duty owed. 40 Legitimate ac-
tions in the bystander cases do exist and although the law
may be unable to fashion relief with scientific precision, this
does not justify denial of all relief. The Dillon guidelines
appear workable and provide the additional benefit of help-
ing to prove that plaintiff has, in fact, suffered damages.' 4'
However, some commentators, including Professor Pros-
ser, who favor extension of liability admit that the Dillon
guidelines are arbitrary. 42 But experience has demonstrated
that, for the most part, these guidelines have a rational basis.
The relationship guideline not only curtails unlimited liabil-
ity, but also helps to guarantee that the emotional distress is
genuine. 43 The contemporaneous observance guideline fur-
138. See id. at _ 338 A.2d at 529. Even the Tobin court admitted that the injury
to the mother was foreseeable. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d
419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969).
139. See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
140. California has certainly proven that it can control bystander recovery. See
supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. This unlimited liability argument was also
used to fight the imposition of strict liability in product liability actions absent privity.
However, because of a thoughtful expansion of liability, industry has not intolerably
suffered from the abandonment of the previous privity requirements.
141. As stated in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, _.., 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1981), it is not
difficult to understand that severe emotional distress has been suffered when the by-
stander, who has a personal relationship with the victim, witnesses the severe injuries
inflicted upon that person.
142. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 335. Tobin expressly pointed out this
alleged defect of the Dillon guidelines. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. See also Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 586; Comment, supra
note 81.
143. See, e.g, Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, _, 417 A.2d 521, 526-27 (1980);
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, _, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975).
Medical authorities agree that the average bystander, that is, one who has no spe-
cial relationship to the victim, ordinarily will not experience any systematic emotional
reaction from witnessing the accident. Leibson, supra note 131, at 197 (1977). This
requirement, therefore, is not arbitrary and also disposes of the fear of unlimited lia-
bility as long as courts require a close, intimate relationship. Id. at 198. Certainly
there will be cases where, at least initially, a close relationship does not appear to
exist, for example, aunts, uncles, and other relatives. In such cases, the plaintiff
should assume the burden of establishing the closeness of the relationship. Id. at 198.
But see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980). The Drew
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ther ensures that the emotional injury is serious. 144 The con-
temporaneous observance requirement, however, should not
be limited, as in California, to actual perception, but should
allow recovery for a person who happened upon the grisly
scene shortly after the accident's occurrence since that per-
son could be expected to experience as much trauma as if he
had actually perceived the accident.145
If Wisconsin were to lift the current policy restrictions
denying bystander recovery, the court would have to fashion
policy guidelines similar to those in Dillon to allow the cause
of action. Under the Wisconsin approach, once a duty of
care is established toward the victim, the defendant is liable
for all the consequences stemming from a breach of duty. 46
court denied plaintifis claim where she lived with the male victim for three years.
The court based its decision on the fact that there was no family relationship and
there was no allegation that defendant knew or should have known of the relation-
ship. This latter requirement demonstrates California's strict construction of the Dil-
lon guidelines. Drew, however, was incorrectly decided given that California has
allowed recovery for siblings and spouses where the defendant, at the time of the
accident, did not know of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. See,
e.g., Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977); Krouse
v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
Relationships which have been held sufficient to establish a basis for recovery are:
parent and child, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968); mother and fetus, e.g., Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr.
12 (1982); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); siblings, e.g., Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); foster parent and child, e.g., Mobaldi v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
See also Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981).
144. All humans will experience the emotional trauma of having someone close
to them die or be seriously injured. Not all types of emotional distress should be
actionable. Certainly in today's society one must develop a thick skin. See Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering. A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 887
(1939). But the sudden shock of witnessing a loved one being injured, one which
most people are unprepared for, deserves recovery. To this end, the contemporaneous
requirement helps to ensure that unlimited liability is not realized. Furthermore, it
ensures that the distress infficted is more serious than it would otherwise be since the
person not only experiences the void which the passing of the victim brings but must
also endure witnessing the inffiction of the pain and suffering upon the victim. See,
e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
Jurisdictions which have gone beyond the Dillon requirement of contemporane-
ous observance have found it necessary to impose some limit just beyond this obser-
vance requirement. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204,
532 P.2d 673 (1975); Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, _ 450
N.E.2d 581, 587 (1983). See also supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
145. Comment, supra note 81, at 871-72.
146. A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d 764,
766 (1974). See supra notes 51-52 & 55-56 and accompanying text.
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These consequences would include harm to the bystander no
matter where his location or the relationship to the victim.
Since foreseeability is not an issue in establishing causa-
tion,147 the fear of unlimited liability could be truly realized.
The Wisconsin court could fashion requirements similar to
the Dillon guidelines in order to enable plaintiffs to establish
a cause of action. 48  These guidelines certainly place ra-
tional limits on the class of plaintiffs and type of recoverable
harm 149 while ensuring the continuance of a just cause of
action. As mentioned previously, these guidelines should
not be strictly applied at the pleading stage of the action.
Rather, if a situation developed where recovery would
"shock the conscience of society," the trial court in Wiscon-
sin has the power, after trial, to deny recovery based upon
public policy. If the Wisconsin Supreme Court is still skepti-
cal of the claim, additional requirements could be imposed
to further ensure its validity. 50 Finally, this cause of action
would not only apply to negligence claims, but also to prod-
ucts liability actions.' 51
147. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52 & 55-56.
148. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, _ 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302
(1978), where the court stated: "[l]t does not matter in practice whether these factors
are regarded as policy considerations imposing limits on the scope of reasonable fore-
seeability. . . or as factors bearing on the determination of reasonable foreseeability
itself."
149. One commentator has asserted that the Dillon factors have nothing to do
with foreseeability. See Comment, supra note 81, at 858. Even if this assertion were
true it would not affect Wisconsin's adoption of the rule given Wisconsin's unique
approach to the duty determination. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
150. Certain courts such as Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, _, 417 A.2d 521, 526-27
(1980), require that the injury to the victim be serious, or that, as in Barnhill v. Davis,
300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981), the plaintiff believe, as would a reasonable person,
that the injury to the victim is serious. One commentator noted that where the vic-
tim's injury is serious, medical authorities are in agreement that the plaintiff can be
expected to suffer severe emotional distress. See Leibson, supra note 131, at 199-200.
Many courts allowing recovery also state that the plaintiffs distress must be serious.
See, e.g., Portee, 84 N.J. at_, 417 A.2d at 526-27. See also Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at
108. For further discussion as to what constitutes a serious emotional injury, see infra
text accompanying note 216.
Hawaii's approach, which rejected all the Dillon factors, is not practical as demon-
strated by its own decisions in Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204,
532 P.2d 673 (1975), and Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632
P.2d 1066 (1981). See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
151. There should be no difference between an action where the mother wit-
nessed the maiming of her child due to the negligence of the driver and an action
where the driver is unable to stop in time due to faulty brakes. See Shepard v. Supe-
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One area yet to be addressed by courts which have al-
lowed bystander recovery is the recovery by family members
for emotional distress suffered as a result of the defendant's
intentional infliction of physical harm on another family
member. For example, while the victim of an aggravated
assault 52 suffers from the physical and emotional scars, the
family members often must also endure great emotional suf-
fering caused by the defendant's conduct. In such a situa-
tion, the victim could bring a civil action against the
defendant. However, the family has also suffered and de-
serves recovery. If Wisconsin were to allow a bystander's
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress where the
defendant negligently caused harm to the victim, then it
should also allow a claim for the emotional distress suffered
by the victim's family as a result of the defendant's inten-
tional conduct.
In determining whether a claim has been established, the
court should apply the four traditional negligence elements
of duty, breach, cause and damage. As proof of recoverable
damages, the court could require that the plaintiff demon-
strate severe emotional distress. 53 The Dillon factors should
not be used to sever liability since the defendant's conduct
was intentional in inflicting harm on the victim. The Dillon
factors originally were developed as a balance between en-
suring that the plaintiff's just claim is heard and the concern
over possible unlimited liability of defendants for their neg-
ligent conduct. Courts should be less concerned with limit-
ing liability where the defendant's conduct is intentional or
aggravated. The rationale behind the extension of recovery
rior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977), and Walker v. Clark Equip.
Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982), which allowed recovery for products liability
claims. But see Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581,
587 (1983), which indicated that if the court had to decide the issue, it probably would
not allow recovery. For an extended discussion of bystander recovery in a products
liability action, see Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which
Permits Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions
Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18 DuQ. L. Rnv. 1 (1979).
152. See, for example, Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979), where the plaintiff-child witnessed the sexual assault of his mother. The court
denied his action because Florida follows the impact rule requiring that the plaintiff
suffer a contemporaneous physical injury.
153. See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of recover-
able damages absent physical injuries.
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absent physical injury to victims of the defendant's inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was that courts were
less concerned with limiting liability and more concerned
with ensuring that victims were justly compensated. 154 This
same reasoning should apply in extending recovery to family
members who suffer severe emotional distress as a result of
the defendant's targeted, antisocial conduct toward his or
her victim.
III. THE PHYSICAL INJURY REQUIREMENT
A. Generally
In order to recover for emotional distress, a majority of
American courts require that the plaintiff's distress be mani-
fested by some physical injury.155 The reasons most often
cited for denial of recovery absent physical injury are that an
emotional disturbance which does not physically manifest it-
self is likely to be so temporary that the task of allowing re-
covery would unduly burden the courts; or, in the absence of
a "guarantee of genuineness" provided by such harm, the
emotional disturbance would be difficult to prove; or, the de-
fendant has merely been negligent and his culpability is not
so great that he should be required to compensate the plain-
tiff for a purely mental disturbance.5 6 However, in cases in-
volving mishandling of corpses and negligent transmission
of death messages, a significant minority of courts have al-
lowed recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
154. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
155. "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the
actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A (1965).
156. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 386 Mass. 540, _, 437 N.E.2d 171,
178-79 (1982) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b
(1965)). In Payton, the plaintiffs, who were daughters of mothers who had taken the
drug D.E.S. during pregnancy, sued the manufacturers for emotional distress caused
by apprehension of the significant possibility of future cancer. The plaintiffs did not
allege any physical injuries. The Massachusetts Supreme Court denied the cause of
action. One has to wonder whether Payton was decided in this manner so as to place
a restraint on liability after the court's liberal decision in Ferriter v. Daniel




without a showing of physical injury. 157  Professor Prosser
noted that these cases allowing recovery all appeared to have
an "especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental dis-
tress, arising from the special circumstances, which serve as
a guarantee ...." 158
The physical injury rule, which requires manifestation of
the emotional distress by physical injury, recently has come
under attack. The leading decision advocating abolition of
the rule is Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.'59 The
plaintiff, Mr. Molien, and his wife were members of the de-
fendant hospital's health plan. Following a routine physical
performed by a staff physician, Mrs. Molien was informed
that she had contracted syphilis. She was treated, then ad-
vised to bring her husband to the hospital for testing. Mr.
Molien's blood test revealed that he did not have syphilis
and it was later discovered that the original diagnosis of
Mrs. Molien was also incorrect. Mr. Molien sued the hospi-
tal and the doctor for negligent infliction of extreme emo-
tional distress and for the subsequent expenses incurred for
marriage counseling in an effort to save his marriage.
Because Mr. Molien was not in the hospital when his
wife was erroneously diagnosed, the defendants argued that
his claim for emotional distress was barred by Dillon. 160 In
Molien the California Supreme Court distinguished Dillon
by finding Mr. Molien a direct victim of, rather than a by-
stander to, the hospital's negligence. 16 1 The Molien court
157. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 329-30.
158. Id. See also Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975), where a daughter was erroneously informed of her mother's death by the
defendant hospital. The court decided to allow a cause of action absent any allega-
tion of physical injury because the plaintiff was owed a duty of care by the hospital
and therefore was a direct victim of the negligence. The court noted that from the
facts of the case, the "guarantee of genuineness" of the emotional distress was present.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. However, any hope that this case stood for
the proposition that New York would not require physical injury when plaintiff is a
direct victim of defendant's negligence has been clouded by the decision in Vaccaro v.
Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980). But see
Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 598, 467 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983), where the court,
after holding that plaintiff was a direct victim rather than a bystander, allowed a
cause of action for emotional distress absent an allegation of physical injury.
159. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
160. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
161. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
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noted, as did the Dillon court, that the foreseeability of the
risk is the essential ingredient in establishing a duty of care
and concluded that the hospital owed a duty given that the
doctor's misdiagnosis, coupled with the recommendation
that Mrs. Molien inform her husband that she had con-
tracted syphilis, could be foreseen to produce marital discord
and emotional distress. 62
Once a duty to the husband was established, the Molien
court examined the personal injury requirement. Noting
that proof of physical injury is the majority rule and is
designed to minimize trivial and false claims, 16 3 the court be-
lieved that the rule did not serve its purpose because it is
both overinclusive and underinclusive. The rule is overin-
clusive because it permits recovery when emotional distress
is accompanied by physical injury, no matter how trivial the
injury. The rule is underinclusive because it mechanically
denies access to possible valid claims. 164 Since the rule did
not adequately serve its purpose, it was no longer justifiable.
Molien relied upon the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in
Rodrigues v. State 165 to establish a new standard that would
protect courts against a potential flood of spurious claims
and shield defendants from unlimited liability. It adopted
Professor Prosser's standard of proof which required some
"guarantee of genuineness" of serious mental injury from
the circumstances of the case. 166 Essentially, the standard re-
quires jurors to assess the damage in light of what a reason-
able person could endure. In addition, the court noted that
circumstances would exist where the alleged emotional in-
jury could be proven by expert medical testimony.167 Since
162. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
163. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
164. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court also found
that the physical injury rule encourages "extravagant pleading and distorted testi-
mony" as to any physical injury suffered. In addition, the court noted that the border
between psychological and physical injury is often blurred. Id. at 929-31, 616 P.2d at
820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
165. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Hawaii was the first jurisdiction to
eliminate the physical injury rule. See supra note 110.




the Molien decision, many jurisdictions have followed its
holding and have eliminated the personal injury rule.168
The Molien decision, however, has not escaped the criti-
cism of California commentators. One commentator asserts
that since Molien creates a duty of care to avoid exposing the
plaintiff to circumstances involving serious emotional dis-
tress, the only limiting factor in the creation of this duty is
that the foreseeable risk involves serious, debilitating emo-
tional distress; and, by equating duty solely with foreseeabil-
ity, California courts have relinquished their ability to weigh
policy concerns, such as the risk of harm incurred against the
burdens imposed upon certain types of conduct and the cost
of compensation.169 If the judge concludes that a reasonable
juror might consider the harm foreseeable, the issue must go
to the jury. Therefore, duty hinges on a jury determination
168. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981);
Montinier v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978);
Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So.2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (bystander case; see supra
note 100 and accompanying text); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1983)
(bystander case); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1981); Bass
v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Versland v. Caron Transp., - Mont. _
- 671 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759
(1983). Several courts appear to be teetering toward abolishing the rule. See, for
example, Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 160, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (1979), where Justice Nix,
in his plurality opinion, advocated abandoning the physical injury rule. See also Vat-
timo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 59 Pa. Commw. 1, 428 A.2d 765 (1981); Hunsley v.
Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). For examples of decisions which re-
quired only a bare, minimal showing of phyical injury, see Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 657, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1973); Richardson v. J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc., 649 P.2d 565, 566 (Okla. 1982) (stating that the pain of hunger would suffice as a
physical injury).
Several recent cases, however, have rejected abandoning the physical injury re-
quirement. See, e.g., Rasmuson v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 Idaho 95, _ 625
P.2d 1098, 1103 (1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171
(1982); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981);
Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982). See
also Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). However, the Virginia
court made an exception to the rule in a wrongful birth case where the physician was
negligent in detecting Tay-Sachs disease. See Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290
S.E.2d 825 (1982). See also Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). How-
ever, one New Jersey court, in a poorly reasoned decision, required physical injury in
direct negligent infliction cases. See Ayers v. Town of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561,
- 461 A.2d 184, 189 (1983) (distinguishing Portee and Berman because those cases
involved bystanders).
169. Note, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actionsfor Emo-




thereby increasing uncertainty and insurance and litigation
costs. 170
In response to this criticism, it must be noted that the
Molien approach does not appear to be entirely inconsistent
with previous California case law addressing the determina-
tion of duty. 171 However, even if such criticism were correct,
it would be of no concern in jurisdictions such as Wisconsin
because, unlike California courts which balance policy fac-
tors at the initial stage of the suit, Wisconsin courts balance
the policy issues at the end of the trial.
172
Another criticism of the Molien approach is that juries
are called upon to rely on their own experiences in establish-
ing causation with the result that liability is now founded
upon foreseeability, with the danger that such foreseeability
will appear stronger in hindsight.173 However, this criticism
rings hollow since juries are always called upon to use their
own experiences as a yardstick. Furthermore, other devices
can be implemented to ensure that the jury properly consid-
ers the evidence in establishing causation. 1
74
But legitimate questions arise over what is a "guarantee
of genuineness."1 75  The crucial problem is determining
whether actual damages exist. By its very nature, a physical
injury is much easier to verify than a mental injury. It has
170. Id.
171. See Comment, The Death of Palsgraf A Comment on the Current Status of
the Duty Concept in California, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 793, 803 (1979). Cf. Baldwin
v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 286, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1981); Kiick v. Levias,
113 Cal. App. 3d 399, 404 n.4, 169 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 n.4 (1980).
172. See, e.g., Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 738, 275
N.W.2d 660, 667 (1979).
173. Note, supra note 169, at 1165.
174. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
175. Note, The Death ofthe Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating Claimsfor
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 213, 228 (1981). The
author proposes several guidelines to limit liability under the "guarantee of genuine-
ness" standard. He also suggests that Molien implied that the guarantee of genuine-
ness was to be found in the nature of the defendant's conduct. Noting that the
defendant's conduct is examined by the court in an intentional infliction of emotional
distress case (that is, the "extreme and outrageous" requirement) to ensure the valid-
ity of the claim, the author believed that approach should not be used since the de-
fendant's conduct was only negligent and it would be difficult to find a guarantee of
genuineness from negligent conduct alone. Rather, the author postulates that the
court could have found a guarantee of genuineness from the eventual disintegration
of the Molien marriage. See id. at 227.
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been noted that a plaintiff, such as Mr. Molien, could testify
that he suffered serious mental distress caused by the mis-
diagnosis of syphilis and would be in a position to recover
under the Molien rationale. The defense could do little to
rebut the allegation of emotional injury except to suggest
that under the circumstances a reasonable person would not
suffer any serious emotional distress. 176
However, a case can be made for using the "guarantee of
genuineness" standard.1 77 Although nebulous, this standard
encompasses all the circumstances surrounding the conduct
of the defendant and the reaction of the plaintiff in order to
establish a standard for recovery, and it relegates the jury to
its proper role as ultimate arbitrator of the case. The stan-
dard has been refined by other jurisdictions concerned about
an open-ended instruction which, in the opinion of some,
gives little guidance to the jury except to instruct that the
jury may rely on its own experiences in determining whether
a compensable injury has occurred. 178
The final problem with Molien is its treatment of the Dil-
lon and Justus bystander recovery decisions. The problem
revolves around determining whether the plaintiff is to be
considered a direct or an indirect victim. 79 If the standard,
as provided in Molien, is the foreseeability of the risk of seri-
ous harm, then it can be argued that Mrs. Dillon falls within
this class of persons. However, the court, still concerned
about unlimited liability, affirmed the Dillon and Justus
standards in "indirect" emotional harm cases. 80 As long as
the Dillon requirements are so strictly construed, there will
be disputes and judicial straining over the particular class to
which the plaintiff belongs.' 8 ' Because of this conflict and
176. Note, supra note 169, at 1167.
177. The "guarantee of genuineness" term was coined by Professor Prosser. It
simply means, and the jury is instructed as such, that given the circumstances, a nor-
mally constituted person could be expected to suffer severe emotional distress. See
Molen, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. See also
Calif. Jury Inst.-Civil 12.73 (West Supp. 1983).
178. See, e.g., Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, _, 451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (1983). See also infra notes 216-21
and accompanying text for an illustration of such refinements.
179. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 603; Note, supra note 169, at 1173.
180. See Mollen, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
181. Note, supra note 169, at 1176.
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the increasing susceptibility of emotional distress to medical
proof, one commentator has suggested abandoning the Dil-
lon standard in favor of the Molien foreseeability test in
both bystander and direct victim cases.' 82 The California
courts have so far refused to do so. 183 However, a recent
California decision appears to suggest a rational approach to
distinguishing between the bystander and direct victim. In
Ochoa v. Superior Court 184 the court suggested that in order
to be considered a direct victim, the defendant, as in Molien,
must take some affirmative action towards the plaintiff
which causes his or her injury. By making this distinction,
California courts can apply the Dillon standards to plaintiffs
who are indirect victims of negligence and apply the Molien
formulation to the direct victims of the defendant's
negligence.
One step not yet taken by California is the elimination of
the physical injury requirement in bystander cases. 85 Use of
this rule makes no sense in a jurisdiction that applies the
Dillon formulation since the Dillon factors address the pol-
icy concerns and ensure the validity of the claim. 186 If medi-
182. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 63, at 609-19. This approach, however,
probably is not practical given the Hawaiian experience with its very liberal by-
stander recovery system. See supra text accompanying notes 109-17.
183. See, e.g., Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980).
The court discussed Molien but concluded that the facts of the instant case were con-
trolled by Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
"The language in Molien is sufficiently broad, it would appear, to permit similar rea-
soning to be applied to the facts of the case before us. However, in its discussion in
Molien, the Supreme Court refers, by citation, to its 1977 Justus decision, without
overruling, modifying or distinguishing that decision beyond the -degree that the court
distinguished Dillon." Cortez, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 909. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
184. 143 Cal. App. 3d 611, _ 191 Cal. Rptr. 907, 917 (1983). But see Delta
Farms Reclam. Dist. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1983), and Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982),
which appear to allow a cause of action under Molien where the plaintiff was a
bystander.
185. See Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 736-37, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 435,440 (1980); Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 542, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 639, 641 (1975).
186. For examples of other jurisdictions which allow bystander recovery and do
not require physical manifestation of emotional distress, see Culbert v. Sampson's
Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437
(Miss. 1982); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio
St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
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cal science is able to diagnose the emotional distress, there is
no purpose served in requiring a physical manifestation in
the bystander situation.
B. The Wisconsin Approach
Wisconsin generally adheres to the majority rule that
there can be no recovery for emotional distress absent a sub-
sequent physical injury. The first decision to explicitly deny
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
without a physical injury was Ver Hagen v. Gibbons8 7 in
1970. In that case the plaintiff charged that the defendant
had negligently constructed his fireplace. When the plaintiff
built a fire, the entire house became engulfed in flames forc-
ing the plaintiff to flee for his life. The plaintiff alleged he
suffered great mental anguish and fear for his well-being."'
The court framed the issue as "whether one can recover for
mental anguish and emotional distress which is the result of
another's negligence and which is not manifested by, or
causative of, any physical injury."1 89 The court quickly re-
viewed the history of emotional distress in Wisconsin and
noted that there has been some uncertainty in Wisconsin
over the physical injury requirement. 190 This uncertainty
was created by cases such as Colla v. Mandella,191 in which
the plaintiff died of a heart attack after the defendant's negli-
gently parked truck rolled into the plaintiffs house. The
court in Colla noted that the impact rule was clearly aban-
doned by Pankropf v. Hinley' 92 and, therefore, allowed re-
covery. Colla, however did not affirmatively address the
physical injury requirement. Also, in Ritter v. Coca-Cola 13
and Vincky v. Midland Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. ,194
which were up on appeal for issues other than physical in-
jury, the court affirmed awards for emotional distress where
187. 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).
188. Id. at 221, 177 N.W.2d at 83.
189. Id. at 221-22, 177 N.W.2d at 84.
190. Id. at 225, 177 N.W.2d at 85.
191. 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
192. 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909).
193. 24 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W.2d 439 (1964).
194. 35 Wis. 2d 246, 151 N.W.2d 77 (1967).
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there had been no significant subsequent physical manifesta-
tion of injury.
The Ver Hagen court ruled that the statement in Alsteen
v. Gehl'95 that the court "now possess[ed] the tools whereby
[it] can intelligently evaluate claims of emotional injury..
.," applied only to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.1 96 The tool to adequately evaluate emotional
distress in negligence cases was to be the physical injury re-
quirement. The dissent, however, noted that proof is equally
difficult in both intentional and negligent actions, and, there-
fore, allowance of recovery should be extended to negligent
infliction of emotional distress since the damage is just as
real. 197
Although the physical injury requirement has been af-
firmed in later cases, the test has been altered to provide that
mental distress is compensable only when "there is an ac-
companying or resulting physical injury."'' 98 This alteration
made it possible for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in
195. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). The four factors the court will use
to evaluate whether a claim exists for intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
(1) the defendant intended to cause the emotional distress; (2) the defendant's conduct
was extreme and outrageous such that an average member of the community would
regard it as being a complete denial of the plaintiffs dignity as a person; (3) the plain-
tiff must prove that defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of his injuries; and (4) the
plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an extreme disabling emotional response.
See id. at 359-60, 124 N.W.2d at 318.
196. Per Hagen, 47 Wis. 2d at 225-26, 177 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Alsteen v.
Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d at 359, 21 N.W.2d at 318).
197. Id. at 228, 177 N.W.2d at 87 (Wilkie, J. dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 675, 292 N.W.2d
816, 822 (1980); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 694, 271 N.W.2d
368, 378 (1978). Both cases cited Per Hagen for this rule; yet Per Hagen only ad-
dressed the issue of whether emotional distress must be manifested by a physical in-
jury. See Per Hagen, 47 Wis. 2d at 220, 177 N.W.2d at 84. Furthermore, Per Hagen's
express holding states that no recovery for emotional distress will be allowed absent a
physical manifestation. See id. at 227, 177 N.W.2d at 86. The confusion of the later
decisions arose because Per Hagen cited Riehl v. DeQuaine, 24 Wis. 2d 23, 127
N.W.2d 788 (1964), to demonstrate that Wisconsin previously allowed recovery for
neurotic trauma when associated with physical injuries. But the Riehl decision was
used only to illustrate that Wisconsin would allow recovery for emotional distress. In
Riehi, the emotional distress claim was parasitic to the physical injury claim. The
question, however, in Per Hagen was whether physical injury must be parasitic to the
emotional distress in order to establish a separate and distinct claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. This distinction, though, may be only a formalistic
one since in either case, as long as there is a physical injury, a claim for emotional
distress can be established. Under this formulation, however, the plaintiff in Hawes
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Hawes v. Germantown Mutual Insurance Co. 199 to allow re-
covery where the plaintiff suffered a scrape on her heel
caused by the collapse of a wall around her. The plaintiff
later suffered weight loss, insomnia and loss of appetite. The
court found that the scrape and the later symptoms alone
were insufficient for recovery, but together they established a
direct causal relationship between the collapsing wall and
the emotional distress.2°°
The supreme court also recently reexamined the rule in
La Fleur v. Mosher.2°' While generally affirming Ver Ha-
gen, the court created an exception in the case of negligent
confinement. In La Fleur the plaintiff was a fourteen year
old who became ill while attending a concert. She was taken
to the La Crosse Police Department where the defendant,
Officer Mosher, unsuccessfully attempted to contact her par-
ents. The plaintiff was put into an open, unoccupied cell be-
cause of her continuing illness and the officer's need to
attend to other duties. The officer locked the door leading to
the cell area in order to assure the plaintiff's privacy. The
officer apparently forgot about the plaintiff and she was not
found until fourteen hours later. The plaintiff alleged that
during this time period she became cold and frightened;
knocked on the outside door to no avail, and generally be-
came convinced that her parents knew she was in the hold-
ing cell, but had chosen to leave her there "to teach her a
lesson." The plaintiff suffered no accompanying or resulting
physical injuries, but she was diagnosed by a psychiatrist as
suffering from a traumatic neurosis. Relying on Per Hagen,
the trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion. o2
On appeal, the La Fleur court reiterated the policy rea-
sons behind the physical injury rule.2 3 Again, it stated that
would have had to bring an action for his scraped heel with the claim for emotional
distress being parasitic to the scraped heel claim.
199. 103 Wis. 2d 524, 309 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1981).
200. See id. at 532, 309 N.W.2d at 360.
201. 109 Wis. 2d 112, 325 N.W.2d 314 (1982).
202. Id. at 113-15, 325 N.W.2d at 315.
203. "The policy behind this reluctance is the fear of flooding the courts with
fraudulent claims and exposing defendants to potentially unlimited liability for every
type of mental disturbance. It further reflects the unwillingness of the law to step in
where social controls are more applicable." Id. at 115, 325 N.W.2d at 316.
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these concerns had not barred recognition of emotional dis-
tress absent physical injury in intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress because the court possessed the "tools" to
intelligently evaluate the emotional distress claim. By re-
quiring the conduct to be "extreme and outrageous," the
very nature of the conduct in an intentional tort provided the
"tool" or the guarantee that the claim was genuine and seri-
ous.204 La Fleur generally affirmed the physical injury rule,
but it added that a negligent confinement by its very nature,
subject to certain requirements, also guarantees the genuine-
ness of the claim of severe emotional distress.2 °5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court believed that under the
facts of the La Fleur case, the likelihood of severe emotional
distress was great. However, by making this exception to the
physical injury rule, the court will most likely be confronted
by plaintiffs in equally compelling situations demanding re-
lief. However, this confrontation may not be the only prob-
lem that will face Wisconsin courts. The trend indicates a
realization among state courts that recent advances made by
medical science can establish psychological injuries. 20 6
Given this trend both inside and outside of Wisconsin in
allowing recovery absent a physical injury, the Wisconsin
courts may be hard-pressed to deny recovery. Currently,
Wisconsin applies the two standard policy justifications, to
deny an emotional distress claim absent a physical injury:
fear of fraudulent claims and exposure of defendants to un-
204. Id. at 116-17, 325 N.W.2d at 316.
205. Id. at 120-21, 325 N.W.2d at 318. The requirements are as follows:
(1) The defendant must have been negligent in confining the plaintiff.
(2) The confinement must be for a substantial period of time.
(3) The circumstances surrounding the confinement must be such that a
reasonably constituted person would be emotionally harmed.
(4) The confinement must be a substantial factor in causing the emotional
distress.
(5) The resulting emotional distress must be severe.
Id.
206. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813,
821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613, 249
N.E.2d 419, 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, _
451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 158, 404 A.2d 672, 678 (1979).




limited liability.2 °7 The physical injury requirement is sup-
posedly designed to distinguish fraudulent from honest
claims and provide a means to evaluate the mental injury.
However, the rule fails to fairly achieve its purpose and
should be replaced by criteria which will.
Under Hawes and previous case law interpreting Ver Ha-
gen, an accompanying physical injury is sufficient to over-
come the pleading barrier. The injury can be slight.20 8  The
accompanying injury requirement thus does nothing to en-
sure that emotional distress was actually suffered since it
bears no relationship to the emotional distress. 2 9 Seen in
this light, the physical injury rule is an arbitrary liability-
limiting device. Such a situation also encourages rather than
discourages fraudulent pleading since plaintiffs may exacer-
bate their injuries to meet the de minimis physical injury re-
quirement.2 10 Since Wisconsin requires an "accompanying
or manifesting" physical injury, the same de minimis physi-
cal injury which applies to the "accompanying" requirement
must also apply to the "manifestation" requirement. Again,
for the same reasons, this encourages fraudulent pleading.
To rectify this situation, Wisconsin could do one of two
things. First, it could require a serious physical injury; how-
ever, this approach does not comport with enlightened legal
thinking in this area.2 ' Second, it could eliminate the injury
requirement altogether.
As to unlimited liability, this fear is less justifiable in a
situation where the plaintiff is a direct victim of the defend-
ant's negligence than when he or she is a bystander. In the
207. See La Fleur, 109 Wis. 2d at 115, 325 N.W.2d at 316.
208. See, e.g., Hawes v. Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 524, 532, 309
N.W.2d 356, 360 (Ct. App. 1981) (plaintiff suffered a scraped heel); Riehl v. De-
Quaine, 24 Wis. 2d 23, 127 N.W.2d 788 (1964) (allowing the cause of action where
plaintiff suffered minor cuts and abrasions in a car accident).
209. If the accompanying physical injury was serious, and the plaintiff later suf-
fered emotional distress as a result of these injuries, then it could be persuasively
argued that the physical injury is evidence of the emotional distress suffered since it is
understandable that one could suffer extreme distress after viewing extensive damage
to his or her body. In this case, however, the plaintiff would bring an action for the
physical injuries with the emotional distress being considered parasitic to this action,
that is, pain and suffering, rather than a separate claim for emotional distress.
210. This danger has been noted in those jurisdictions which have disposed of the
physical injury requirement. See Note, supra note 175, at 223-24.
211. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1.
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bystander situation,212 unlimited liability may be realized
where there are no limits to recovery. However, if the de-
fendant's negligent act is directed toward the plaintiff, he or
she should be liable for those damages that are inflicted. If
damages can be proven, then liability is not unlimited,
rather it is limited to harm directly inflicted upon the victim
by the defendant's negligence. The La Fleur court described
this fear as exposing the defendant to liability for "every
type of mental disturbance. 213 Wisconsin could require, as
it does for an intentional infliction claim,214 and similar to
other jurisdictions recognizing the negligent infliction
claim, 215 that a severe, debilitating emotional distress be
216proven. 6 This could be accomplished by requiring that in-
dependent, objective evidence be introduced to verify the
mental injury,217 expert medical testimony be used where
needed28 and a jury instruction be read allowing recovery
212. This is assuming that the Dillon factors are not used to limit the scope of
liability.
213. La Fleur, 109 Wis. 2d at 115, 325 N.W.2d at 316.
214. Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359-61, 124 N.W.2d 312, 318 (1963) (fourth
requirement).
215. See, e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, _ 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983).
216. Wisconsin has recognized that several forms of neurosis are actionable. See,
e.g., La Fleur v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 122, 325 N.W.2d 314, 318 (1982) (traumatic
neurosis); Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 144, 201 N.W.2d 580, 588 (1972)
(mixed neurotic and psychosomatic type). See also Riehl v. DeQuaine, 24 Wis. 2d 23,
30-31, 127 N.W.2d 788, 792-93 (1964). In these cases there was no physical manifesta-
lion of the emotional distress.
One commentator noted:
What "harm" then is necessary to support a threshold tort? One example is
"shock" - the sudden agitation of the mental senses which temporarily inca-
pacitates the victim and requires at least minimum medical attention. Other
examples are continuing nervousness, sleeplessness, or nausea for which a phy-
sician would prescribe medication. Beyond this threshold are the neuroses,
resulting psychosomatic disabilities, and other more serious illnesses. "Harm,"
then, is mental distress serious enough to require medical attention.
Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Ner-
vous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 512, 517 (1968).
217. Prosser, supra note 144, at 888. In a slightly different context Professor Pros-
ser urged that this standard be used to evaluate injuries caused by intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. However, this standard is equally applicable to negligence
actions. As an example, relatives and acquaintances could testify to the plaintifi's
condition before the negligent act and after.
218. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Mo. 1983); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983). See also Comment, supra note 1.
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only when a reasonable person, normally constituted, would
be unable to adequately cope under the circumstances.1 9
This formulation should satisfy those critics who are skepti-
cal of both the psychological injury and those persons in the
health care industry who treat and may testify to the exist-
ence of such an injury. Furthermore, if a physical manifes-
tation of the mental injury exists, this evidence could be
introduced to demonstrate the degree of the mental injury
suffered.220 Finally, the built-in guarantee to at least assure
a credible claim is the plaintiff's attorney. Given the time
and expense involved in bringing an action, if a credible
claim cannot be made most experienced attorneys probably
would not follow through with a trial.
As a practical consideration, the elimination of the physi-
cal injury requirement would also eliminate the increasingly
difficult task of distinguishing between a physical manifesta-
tion and a purely emotional reaction.221 As a final note, rec-
ognition of this action would apply only to tort and not
contract actions.222
Wisconsin justifies the different treatments of intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress by asserting
that under intentional infliction, courts have the "tools" to
ensure the validity of the claim, that is, "extreme and outra-
geous" conduct of the defendant. Although this requirement
219. As in Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970), courts have
always expressed confidence in the jury's ability to detect a fraudulent claim. See,
e.g, Towns v. Anderson, 196 Colo. 517, _, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (1978). For an excel-
lent example, see Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397
(1956), where the jury awarded the plaintiff $.06 for her emotional distress.
220. See, e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, ._, 451 N.E.2d 759, 764-65
(1983).
221. See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771-72 (Mo. 1983), in which the
court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment c (1965) forecast
this problem. See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 100, 115 n.6 (1959), which noted that
mental injuries many times may be characterized by complex physical reactions, and
because of an accident of pleading, they are characterized as mental rather than
physical.
222. Because negligent infliction of emotional distress is a tort action it would not
apply when emotional distress is inflicted by a breach of contract. However, if the
conduct of the defendant reaches the level of a bad faith tort, such damages should be
allowed for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Deno v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 527, 617 P.2d 35 (1980); Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal. App. 3d
754, 761-63, 136 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818-20 (1977). But see Jarvis v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 448 A.2d 407, 410 (N.H. 1982).
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may provide added justification for imposing liability, it
may not provide an accurate barometer of the degree of
plaintiff's emotional distress. This inaccuracy is because the
outrageous requirement, while measuring the defendant's
culpability, does not focus on the plaintiff's reaction.
Rather, it assumes a certain reaction to the defendant's con-
duct. Assuredly, in many situations the plaintiff will suffer
extreme distress caused by the defendant's outrageous con-
duct. However, courts following the physical injury rule fail
to recognize that emotional distress, whether intentionally or
negligently inflicted, is usually the same "and does not be-
come more real simply because it was intentionally
inflicted." 223
Besides the "outrageousness" tool, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, possibly seeking further justification for the
distinction in the imposition of liability, recently stated:
"With advancing techniques in psychiatry and clinical psy-
chology, we concluded that triers of fact could make intelli-
gent, evaluative judgments on a plaintiff's claim for damages
arising out of the defendant's alleged intentional infliction of
emotional distress."22 4 But who is the psychiatrist examining
- the plaintiff or the defendant? Of course the psychiatrist
is examining the plaintiff's emotional reaction and not the
defendant's conduct. Modem medicine's ability to diagnose
the level of emotional distress is not premised upon whether
the distress was intentionally or negligently inflicted, rather,
the physician is examining the plaintiff's condition with the
stimulus or defendant's conduct being but one factor in his
or her diagnosis. Therefore, the recognition of a psychia-
223. Millard, Intentionally and Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: Toward a
Coherent Reconciliation, 15 IND. L. REv. 617, 630 (1982). For example, assume that
the defendant was driving a car down the street or piloting a plane at 10,000 feet. If
the defendant increases the speed of his car and intentionally swerves from traffic
towards a pedestrian, or the pilot purposely puts the plane into a 5,000 foot dive,
society would probably label such conduct "outrageous." Any severe emotional dis-
tress suffered by pedestrians in the path of the car or passengers in the plane could be
recovered. However, if a faulty steering mechanism caused the car to swerve towards
the pedestrians or a poorly maintained engine caused the plane to dive 5,000 feet, the
plaintiffs in these two situations would not state a cause of action, absent a physical
injury. However, in both cases the level of distress suffered would likely be the same.




trist's competence to diagnose emotional distress should not
be limited to intentional torts.
Today, the underlying justification supporting retention
of the physical injury rule is that if this rule is eliminated,
the burden of proof in a negligent infliction action is much
less than the burden in an intentional infliction action, al-
though with the intentional infliction tort the culpability of
the defendant is much greater.22 5 This greater level of culpa-
bility initially justified imposition of liability absent physical
injury because the desire to punish for such conduct out-
weighed the policy considerations limiting liability, even at a
time when the state of medical science was less able to accu-
rately diagnose the mental injury.226 However, given that
Wisconsin227 and other jurisdictions2 28 recognize that medi-
cal science can diagnose mental injury, the time has come to
eliminate artificial barriers to recovery and to adopt a rule
based upon the usual tort principles which allow a cause of
225. Since Hawes v. Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 524, 309 N.W.2d
356 (Ct. App. 1981), the Wisconsin plaintiffs ability to state and prove a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, even with the physical injury rule, may be
less than the burden on the plaintiff to state and prove the extreme and outrageous
requirement in an intentional infliction claim. Determining what level of conduct is
necessary to establish "extreme and outrageous" is necessarily a question for the jury.
However, in previous cases the appellate review of trial court decisions on summary
judgment motions indicate that the alleged level of conduct needs to be quite egre-
gious. See McKissick v. Schroeder, 70 Wis. 2d 825, 235 N.W.2d 686 (1975) (alleged
refusal by police to allow plaintiff to call for medical assistance for dying son while
the police conducted extensive questioning was sufficient to state a claim); Laska v.
Steipreis, 69 Wis. 2d 307, 231 N.W.2d 196 (1975) (allegation that landlord drove his
car across lessee's property in an attempt to collect rents due or drive plaintiff off the
property was insufficient to state a cause of action); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295,
215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (allegation that a defendant harrassed a woman constantly over
telephone and in person was sufficient to state a cause of action).
In jurisdictions that have eliminated the physical injury rule, but still follow the
Restatement (Second) approach for intentional infliction of emotional distress, this
disparity in the level of proof required, given the difference in degree of culpability,
has not yet been recognized. See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d
611, ., 191 Cal. Rptr. 907, 915 (1983); Delia v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 483-84,
184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 794-95 (1982).
226. See Millard, supra note 223, at 625.
227. See, e.g., Wright v. Hasley, 86 Wis. 2d 572, 576-77, 273 N.W.2d 319, 321
(1979). See also Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 142-44, 201 N.W.2d 580, 586-
87 (1972).
228. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813,
821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, _, 451 N.E.2d
759, 767 (1983). See also Comment, supra note 1, at 1248.
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action, absent physical injury, for negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, if the plaintiff
can establish duty, breach, cause and severe emotional inju-
ries, recovery should be allowed. Similarly, if the defendant
acted intentionally to cause emotional distress, recovery
should be allowed where severe emotional distress was in-
flicted. The extreme and outrageous conduct of the defend-
ant, if it in fact exists, should justify imposition of punitive
damages.2 9
IV. CONCLUSION
As courts have struggled with the underlying policy con-
siderations in extending liability, suspicion of the emotional
injury has shrouded the development of the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim. Even under this cloud,
many courts have challenged the traditional policy concerns
restraining liability. Their experience has demonstrated that
workable formulas which encompass the policy concerns
that previously denied extension of liability exist.
Usually at the forefront of legal development, the Wis-
consin court has remained a spectator for the better part of a
decade as other jurisdictions struggled with the issue of re-
covery for emotional damage. This nonparticipation, at
least, presents the Wisconsin courts with the opportunity to
benefit from the experience of other juridictions that devel-
oped workable formulas. Additionally, the apparent trepi-
dation which the Wisconsin courts have experienced when
addressing the issue of emotional injury appears to be wan-
ing in light of the Hawes v. Germantown Mutual Insurance
Company230 and La Fleur v. Mosher 23' decisions. The time
229. An alternate, but less desirable, method to assure a "guarantee of genuine-
ness" for a negligent infliction claim is to require that the plaintiff prove a high degree
of negligence, that is, recklessness, on the part of the defendant and that it be shown
by clear and convincing evidence. A similar approach was used by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court when in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 273-75, 300, 294
N.W.2d 437, 446, 457-58 (1980), it faced the issue of whether punitive damages were
recoverable in a products liability action. Assuming that physical injury rule is elim-
inated, raising the threshold of proof would eliminate the burden of proof disparity
between negligent infliction and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
230. 103 Wis. 2d 524, 309 N.W.2d 356 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
231. 109 Wis. 2d 112, 325 N.W.2d 314 (1982).
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for recognition of a separate claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress has arrived.
JOHN E. FLANAGAN
